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Abstract
It is shown that the radiological burden due to the battle-field use of circa
400 tons of depleted-uranium munitions in Iraq (and of about 40 tons in
Yugoslavia) is comparable to that arising from the hypothetical battle-field
use of more than 600 kt (respectively 60 kt) of high-explosive equivalent
pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclear weapons.
Despite the limited knowledge openly available on existing and future
nuclear weapons, there is sufficient published information on their physical
principles and radiological effects to make such a comparison. In fact, it is
shown that this comparison can be made with very simple and convincing ar-
guments so that the main technical conclusions of the paper are undisputable
— although it would be worthwhile to supplement the hand calculations
presented in the paper by more detailed computer simulations in order to
consolidate the conclusions and refute any possible objections.
From a strategic perspective, the breaking of the taboo against the in-
tentional battle-field use of radioactive materials, which lasted from 1945 to
1991, can therefore be interpreted as a preparation for the progressive in-
troduction of fourth-generation nuclear weapons whose battle-field use will
cause a low (but non-negligible) residual radioactive environment. It can
therefore be argued that besides its military function, the use of depleted-
uranium in Iraq and Yugoslavia may have served a political purpose: to
soften the opposition of the Western public opinion to the induction of ra-
dioactivity on the battle-field, and to get the World population accustomed to
the combat use of depleted-uranium and fourth-generation nuclear weapons.
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1 Introduction
The last two major military campaigns in which the full extent of the Western
military superiority was displayed — Iraq and Yugoslavia — were characterized
by the extensive use of precision guided delivery systems and depleted-uranium
munitions [1].1
While there has been some political opposition in a number of countries to the
battle-field use of depleted-uranium projectiles, and considerable reaction from
many environmental organizations world-wide, there has been little analysis of
the strategic-political reasons why such ammunition was used in the first place.
Of course, it has been stressed that opposition to these weapons could have been
avoided if the low-radioactive U-238 would have been replaced by some non-
radioactive material such as tungsten. However, the possible link of the use of
depleted-uranium to a gradual shift towards the actual battle-field use of nuclear
weapons seems not to have been fully appreciated.
The purpose of this paper is to show that despite the relatively “low” radioactive
nature of U-238, the radiological impact of its use in conventional ammunition is
comparable to that of the battle-field use of hypothetical fourth-generation nuclear
weapons in which the explosive power would derive from thermonuclear fusion
rather than nuclear fission — and in which essentially zero fission reactions would
take place because the “fission-trigger” used in ordinary hydrogen bombs would
be replaced by some other device [2].
Fourth-generation nuclear weapons are under active development in all major
nuclear weapon states — and all major industrial powers such as Germany and
Japan are actively developing the technology required to develop such weapons.
In a nut-shell, the principle of these new types of nuclear weapons is to trigger (by
some advance technology such as a superlaser, magnetic compression, antimatter,
etc.) a relatively small thermonuclear explosion in which a deuterium-tritium
mixture is burnt in a device whose weight and size are not much larger than a few
kilograms and liters. Since the yield of these warheads could go from a fraction
of a ton to several tens, or hundreds, of tons of high-explosive equivalent, their
delivery by precision guided munitions or other means will dramatically increase
the fire-power of those who possess them — without crossing the threshold of
using kiloton to megaton size nuclear weapons, and therefore without breaking
the taboo against the first-use of weapons of mass-destruction.
Consequently, if the precision guided delivery systems used in Iraq and Yu-
1According to official accounts, no depleted-uranium ammunition was used in the more recent
war in Afghanistan.
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goslavia would have been loaded with fourth-generations nuclear warheads rather
than conventional explosives, much less of them could have been used to achieve
the same military objective — although at the cost of a radiological burden that
we estimate in this paper and compare to that of depleted-uranium munitions.
The somewhat surprising fact that the medium- to long-term radiological bur-
den arising from the large-scale battle-field use of depleted-uranium is comparable
to that of many kilotons equivalent of fourth-generation nuclear weapons stems
from the fact that in these weapons the main source of explosive power is fusion
rather than fission. Therefore, the radiological burden induced by the detonation of
fourth-generation nuclear weapons derives primarily from the unburnt tritium that
is dispersed in the environment by the explosion, and secondarily from the activa-
tion of the air, ground, and concrete structures by the neutrons that are produced
during the explosion. Since tritium is a relatively “low” radioactive material, very
significative amounts of tritium are required to produce a radiological burden com-
parable to that of the U-238 expended in Iraq or Yugoslavia. This explains why it
is meaningful to compare the radiological effect of the conventional-weapon’s use
of a relatively harmless nuclear material such as U-238 to the nuclear-weapon’s
use of the most important thermonuclear fuel: tritium.
Throughout the paper we tried to remain at the lowest possible technical level in
order to make it understandable to as many non-specialists as possible. Similarly,
we cite a variety of references to show that there exist many open sources in
which the information used in our paper can be found. In particular, concerning
the technicalities of thermonuclear weapons and their radiological effects, much
can be inferred from papers published in the 1950-60s during the debate over the
hydrogen bomb and the atmospheric test of nuclear weapons, e.g., [3]; papers
published during the 1960-70s in support of “peaceful nuclear explosions,” e.g.,
[4, 5]; papers published in the 1970-80s during the debate over the “neutron
bomb,” e.g., [6, 7, 8]; and more recent publications related to the quest for fourth-
generation nuclear weapons [2].
The organization of this paper is as follows: In section (1) we calculate an upper
limit to the radiological burden due to the battle-field use of depleted-uranium.
This burden will be compared in sections 2 and 5 to the corresponding burden
calculated by similar methods for the battle-field use of fourth-generation nuclear
weapons. In section (2) a simple comparison is made in which the effects of the
neutrons produced during the explosion are neglected. In section (3) we calculate
the dominant contributions to the delayed radiological effects of the explosion of
pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclear weapons. In section (4) we estimate the
magnitude of a fourth-generation nuclear weapon’s engagement equivalent to the
radiological burden due to the expenditure of a given amount of depleted-uranium
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ammunition. Finally, in the conclusion, we summarize and discuss the main points
established in the paper.
2 Upper limit to the radiological burden due to
the battle-field use of depleted-uranium
Armour-piercing munitions containing depleted-uranium (DU) were first used
during the 1991 Gulf War, therefore breaking a 46 years long taboo against the
intentional use or induction of radioactivity in combat.2 Similar ammunition was
used more recently in the conflict involving NATO troops in Yugoslavia.
The DU in these anti-tank weapons is initially in solid form, e.g., in the case
of the API PGU 14/B projectiles delivered by A-10 ground-attack aircrafts, in the
form of a 96 mm long and 16 mm diameters cylinder which constitutes the main
component of the armor-piercing penetrators.
“When these penetrators strike a hard target, such as a tank, a large fraction
of their kinetic energy is converted into heat in less than a millisecond. This
rapid release of energy can convert much of the DU into small, hot fragments and
particles. The smaller fragments can burn, generating DU-oxide aerosols. When
a penetrator strikes a soft target, such as a personnel carrier, truck, or soil, much
less aerosol is generated and much of the DU penetrator may remain intact” [10,
p.132].
Consequently, there can be much debate about how much of the DU expended
in a military campaign has actually been dispersed in the biosphere in the form of
aerosols or dust, and how much can be recovered and safely disposed of.
For the purpose of the comparison that is subject of this paper we will make
the maximizing assumption that all of the DU could have been dispersed so that its
radiological impact is directly related to the total amount of DU used in the conflict.
This conservative assumption can of course be criticized on several grounds, and
we will come back to it in the concluding section. However, it can already be said
that the main conclusion of this study will not be affected by this assumption since
a corresponding maximizing assumption can be made concerning the dispersal of
radioactive materials in the combat use of fourth-generation nuclear weapons.
2Depleted uranium munitions were primarily designed to stop a massive tank attack by the
nuclear-armed Warsaw Pact Organization. Despite of this, when the U.S. military’s intention to
use uranium bullets became public, the program was denounced in the Congressional Record as
“shocking” [9].
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The overall radiological burden, which we express in units of “Roentgen
equivalent for men,” rem,3 is related to the specific radioactivity of the material
under consideration, i.e., the number of disintegrations per second and per gram of
material. This specific activity α is a function of the half-life t1/2 and the atomic
weight A, and is conventionally normalized relative to the radioactivity of 1 gram
of radium-226 whose half-life is 1620 years. Therefore,
α =
1620
t1/2
×
226
A
[Ci/g] . (1)
For depleted-uranium, i.e., U-238, this gives a specific activity of 3.4 × 10−7
Ci/g which is listed in the last line of Table 1. In order to translate this activity
into a radiological burden assuming that somehow the DU will be intaken by
human beings, it is necessary to apply a conversion factor which we borrow
from the official regulations based on the recommendations of the International
Commission on Radiation Protection [11]. The concept underlying this conversion
is that of the “Equivalent Dose at the Critical Organ” (EDCO), which results in the
conversion factors D listed in Table 1, that gives a specific burden of βU = 24 rem
per gram of U-238 according to the formula
β = D × α [rem/g] . (2)
The overall burden due to a mass mU of DU is then
B(238U) = βUmU [rem] (3)
so that if this equation is applyed to the 400 t of U-238 expended in Iraq, one
gets a figure of about 1010 rem, which constitutes the extreme upper limit to the
radiological impact of that amount of DU.
3 Simplified comparison
It is well known that in nuclear explosions about 5000 to 20000 Ci/kt of tritium are
produced by the fusion reaction, while only about 1 Ci/kt of tritium is produced by
the fission process [4].4 It is also elementary knowledge that thermonuclear fusion
3We use the “old” radiological units (Ci, rad, rem, etc.) in this paper because most of the papers
dealing with nuclear weapons, and most of the cited references, still use these units instead of the
modern ones: 1 Bq = 1/(3.7× 1010) Ci, 1 Gy = 100 rad, 1 Sv = 100 rem, etc.
4This is why in some applications of “peaceful nuclear explosions,” such as gas well stimulation,
fission devices surrounded by a neutron shield were preferred to fusion devices, despite the fact that
fission devices produce large amounts of fission-products, while fusion devices are comparatively
much “cleaner” [5, p.434]
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produces an energy equivalent to 133 t of high-explosive for each gram of tritium
consumed, which corresponds to 1.45 × 1024 deuterium-tritium fusion reactions
per kt (see, e.g., [12, 2]). One can therefore derive from these figures a simple
estimate of the “tritium-inefficiency” of a thermonuclear explosive, assuming that
all its energy yield comes from the burning of tritium, and that the tritium released
in the environment is the amount that has not been burnt during the explosion:
ǫ =
tritium not burnt during the explosion
tritium initially present or produced during the explosion . (4)
This requires to know the specific activity of tritium, which can be calculated
using equation (1) and gives the figure listed in the first line of Table 1. Therefore,
since 10−4 g of tritium corresponds to 1 Ci, the burning of 1/0.0133 ∼= 75 Ci of
tritium corresponds to an explosive yield of 1 tons. This means that according to
reference [4] an actual thermonuclear explosive has a tritium-inefficiency of about
7 to 27 %, which is in fair agreement with reference [3] which assumes ǫ = 10 %.
These estimates show that in terms of tritium economy, thermonuclear explo-
sives are fairly efficient, the efficiency (or burn-up)
η = 1− ǫ =
tritium burnt during the explosion
tritium initially present or produced during the explosion (5)
being on the order of 73 to 93 % for the high-yield explosives referred to in
references [3, 4].
However, for low-yield thermonuclear explosions, whether in the kiloton range
as in “neutron bombs” [8],5 or in the sub-kiloton range as in inertial confinement
fusion experiments and fourth-generation nuclear weapons, achievement of high
efficiencies is much more difficult and an efficiency of 30 to 50 % is considered as
reasonable [2]. Moreover, in such low-yield devices, much less tritium is bred in
situ during the explosion so that the efficiency η is essentially equal to the amount
of tritium burnt over the amount of tritium initially present in the device.
Therefore, if the short term effects and the radioactivity induced by the neutrons
produced in the explosion are neglected, one gets a zeroth order approximation of
the delayed radiological impact of a fourth-generation nuclear weapon by assuming
that the burden is solely due to the dispersal of the unburnt tritium. Using equations
similar to (1) and (2), this burden will be
B(3T ) = (1− η)βTmT , (6)
5The neutron bomb, a typical third-generation nuclear weapon, is not a pure-fusion weapon
since about half of its explosive power comes from fission.
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where βT is the specific burden listed on the first line of Table 1, and mT the mass
of tritium initially present in the weapon.
Combining equations (6) and (3) we can therefore estimate the amount of
tritium equivalent to a given amount of DU, i.e.,
mT =
1
1− η
βU
βT
mU . (7)
With a tritium efficiency of of η = 0.5, we therefore find that 400 t of DU
correspond to 9.6 kg of tritium, which are equivalent to an explosive power of
0.5 × 9.6 kg × 133 kt/kg = 640 kt of high explosives.
4 Delayed radiological effects of pure-fusion
fourth-generation nuclear weapons
The delayed radiological effects of the neutrons produced during thermonuclear
explosions have been extensively discussed during the hydrogen bomb debate
of the 1950s [3], and to a lesser extent during the neutron bombe debate of
the 1980s [6]. In the realm of non-military applications of nuclear energy, the
problem of shielding nuclear reactors [13], and particle accelerators [14], from the
environment has lead to the study of similar problems. Consequently, we know
from these studies that there are only a few critical nuclear reactions, i.e., reactions
producing radioactive nuclei with a life-time larger than a few years.
For neutrons escaping into the air, the critical reaction is the 14N(n, p)14C
process in which carbon-14 is produced; and in interactions with the ground (e.g.,
the soil and concrete structures) the critical reactions are 23Na(n, 2n)22Na and
59Co(n, γ)60Co in which sodium-22 and cobalt-60 are produced. The radiobio-
logical characteristics of these nuclei are listed in Table 1. For interactions with
other materials, e.g., iron, most activation products are short-lived and their effect
can be considered as part of the prompt lethality of the weapon.
In order to simplify the discussion, we will further assume that the fourth-
generation nuclear weapons under consideration can be considered of the “pure-
fusion” type [2]. Therefore, we assume that they derive the bulk of their explosive
power from the deuterium-tritium reaction, and that their overall radiological
impact is dominated by this reaction so that the effect of other radioactive materials
that may be present in the device can be neglected.
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4.1 Neutron interactions with the air
In good approximation, the vast majority of neutrons released into the atmosphere
are ultimately captured by nitrogen which then decays into carbon-14. Since each
tritium nucleus fusing with a deuterium nucleus produces one neutron, mT g of
tritium, A = 3, will produce 14
3
mT g of carbon-14, A = 14. Therefore, the
radiological burden due to neutrons interacting with air will be
Ba(
14C) = 14
3
φaβCηmT (8)
where φa is the fraction of neutrons escaping into the atmosphere, and βC the
specific burden of carbon-14 (see Table 1).
4.2 Neutron interactions with concrete structures
We assume for concrete a typical composition of the kind used in normal con-
struction which contains about 0.5 % of sodium per weight [13, Table.22a]. For
comparison, a special barytes concrete of the kind used in nuclear reactor shielding
contains only about 0.1 % of sodium per weight [13, Table.22b].
The fraction of neutrons which interact with the sodium nuclei and produce the
radioactive isotope sodium-22 is given by the macroscopic activation cross-section
Σact = κnσ (9)
where κ is the concentration of sodium nuclei in the concrete, n the nuclear density,
and σ the fusion-neutron sodium-22 activation cross-section given by [15] (see
Table 2).
Similarly to the argument that lead to equation (7), since each tritium nucleus
fusing with a deuterium nucleus produces one neutron, the radiological burden
due to neutrons interacting with concrete is
Bc(
22Na) = 22
3
φc
Σact
Σabs
βNaηmT (10)
where φc is the fraction of neutrons escaping into concrete and Σabs the macro-
scopic fusion-neutron absorption cross-section of concrete [7, p.186] (see Table 2).
4.3 Neutron interactions with the soil
Contrary to air, the chemical composition of the soil can considerably vary from
place to place. The average concentration of sodium in rocks can vary from less
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than 1 % (average limestone) to about 4 % (average igneous rock). Moreover,
the sodium concentration will obviously be significantly higher in coastal regions
because of the proximity of sea water. In the case of cobalt, reference [3] gives
a concentration of 10−5 which seems rather high compared to other sources.
In the present paper we take the soil composition used in reference [14], a cobalt
concentration of 10−6 together with the cobalt-60 activation cross-section given by
[3], and the macroscopic fusion-neutron absorption cross-section in soil published
in [7, p.184] (see Table 3).
By the same reasoning that lead to equation (10), the contributions Bs(22Na)
and Bs(60Co) to the radiological burden due to neutrons interacting with the soil
are given by equations identical to (9) and (10), where all variables and parameters
are given the appropriate values.
5 Fourth-generation nuclear weapons yield equiva-
lent do the radiological burden due to the use of
depleted-uranium munitions
Collecting the results of the two previous sections, the overall burden is
B(η,mT ) = B(
3T ) +Ba(
14C) +Bc(
22Na) +Bs(
22Na) +Bs(
60Co) (10)
which becomes, putting all the numbers in,
B(η,mT ) = 2× 10
6(1− η)mT
+
(
6.5× 103φa + 8× 10
4φc + 6× 10
4φs + 9× 10
3φs
)
ηmT (11)
where φa + φc + φs = 1. This expression gives, as a function of the tritium
burn-up η, the radiological burden in units of rem due to the combustion of ηmT
g of tritium, which correspond to an explosive yield of
Y = 133 ηmT [t HE] (12)
tons equivalent of high-explosives (HE).
Expression (11) shows that for “ground bursts” (i.e., explosions due to the
engagement of targets on the ground) the radiological burden due to neutron
interactions is dominated by the activation of concrete structures and the soil
because in this case it is likely that φa < φc + φs. Moreover, the combined
numerical factor obtained by adding the contributions of the activation of 22Na
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and 60Co in the soil is 6.9 × 104, i.e., nearly equal to the factor multiplying the
contribution of concrete. Therefore, in the case of ground bursts, we can simplify
(11) and write
Bg(η,mT ) ≈ 2× 10
6(1− η)mT + 8× 10
4φgηmT (13)
where φg = φc + φs is the fraction of neutrons interacting with the ground (i.e.,
not escaping into air).
The first conclusion that can be draw from (11) and (13) is that for tritium burn-
ups on the order of η ≈ 0.5 the radiological burden is to a good approximation
determined by the dispersal of the unburnt tritium — so that the assumption made
in section 2 was justified.
The second conclusion is that in ground bursts the contribution from the ground
materials’s activation becomes only important when η gets close to one, more
precisely, when
η ≥ 1−
8× 104
2× 106
φg , (14)
i.e., η ≥ 0.96 for φg = 1.
We can therefore make two extreme assumptions to estimate the amount of
tritium, and thus the explosive yield, equivalent to the radiological burden of a
given amount of DU:
• η < 0.9 Combining (7) and (12):
Y ≈ 133
η
1− η
βU
βT
mU [t-HE/g-DU] . (15)
• η > 0.9 Combining (3), (12), and (13):
Y ≈ 133
1
φg
βU
8× 104
mU [t-HE/g-DU] . (16)
As can be seen, (15) corresponds to a lower-limit of the yield, while (16) gives
an upper limit which corresponds to the fact that in high-tritium-efficiency pure-
fusion weapons the radiological burden is dominated by the neutron activation of
the materials in the proximity of the explosion.
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6 Conclusion
The main technical result of this paper are equations (15) and (16) which give
reasonable estimates of the total explosive yield of a hypothetical engagement
of fourth-generation nuclear weapons that would result in the same radiological
burden as a given total amount of depleted uranium expended in combat. In
deriving these equations the respective radiological burdens of the two types of
weapon systems are used only as a means for comparing their relative medium-
to long-term radiological impacts on human beings and the environment. The
absolute values of the burdens calculated in this paper should therefore not be
trusted. However, since similar conservative assumptions are made for both types
of weapon systems, the ratio of these burdens provides a significative means for
comparing their respective delayed radiological impacts, and to derive the yields
given by equations (15) and (16).
In particular, the assumption made in section 2 of “total dispersal” of the
depleted-uranium is matched by the assumption that the unburnt tritium is also
totally dispersed in the environment. In order to improve the accuracy of our
comparison one would have to study complicated scenarios of the engagment
of both types of weapon systems, which may imply many self-compensating
hypothesis that are not likely to significantly change our major conclusion — that
the expenditure of many tons of DU has a radiological impact comparable to the
combat use of many kilotons of pure-fusion thermonuclear explosives.
Indeed, assuming a tritium burn-up of 50 % (η = 0.5) in equation (15), and
that half of the neutrons interact with the ground (φg = 0.5) in equation (16), we
get a total yield of circa 60 kt, respectively 3 Mt, in the expenditure of 40 t of
depleted-uranium as in Yugoslavia — and ten times more in Iraq.
These total explosive yields mean that in order to match the radiological
burden due to the combat use of depleted-uranium in these countries, one could
have hypothetically used several thousands precision guided delivery systems,
each carrying a fourth-generation nuclear warhead with a yield in range of one to
hundred tons of high-explosive equivalent, instead of the few tens or hundreds of
kilograms of high-explosives currently delivered by these systems.
Such a possibility, which is far from being hypothetical [2], is shedding a
dramatic light on the strategic-political significance of the breaking of the taboo
against the battle-field use of depleted-uranium. Of course, it has been repeatedly
stated that the absolute burden due to the combat use of depleted uranium is small
[16, 17], but such a use is a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of a norm that
was in force since 1945.
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half specific EDCO specific
life activity burden
units year Ci/g rem/µCi rem/g
symbol t1/2 α D β
T-3 12.3 1× 104 2× 10−4 2× 106
C-14 5570 4.7 3× 10−4 1.4× 103
Na-22 2.6 6.4× 103 2× 10−2 1.3× 108
Co-60 5.26 1.2× 103 4× 10−3 4.6× 106
U-238 4.5× 109 3.4× 10−7 70 24
Table 1: Radiobiological characteristics of critical materials
symbol units
mass density ρ 2.37 g/cm3
mean atomic weight A 25.7
nuclear density n 5.5× 1022 cm−3
neutron absorption cross-section Σ 0.026 cm2/g
Na-23 concentration κ 4.9× 10−3 g-Na/g-concrete
Na-22 activation cross-section σ 8× 10−27 cm2
Table 2: Mean nuclear characteristics of Portland concrete
symbol units
mass density ρ ∼ 1.8 g/cm3
mean atomic weight A 21.7
nuclear density n 5× 1022 cm−3
neutron absorption cross-section Σ 0.030 cm2/g
Na-23 concentration κ 4.7× 10−3 g-Na/g-soil
Na-22 activation cross-section σ 8× 10−27 cm2
Co-59 concentration κ 1× 10−6 g-Co/g-soil
Co-60 activation cross-section σ 6× 10−23 cm2
Table 3: Average nuclear characteristics of dry top soil
14
